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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FILLING SENATORIAL VACANCIES
Trinsey v. Pennsylvania (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 4, 1991, United States Senator John Heinz died in a mid-
air collision near Philadelphia when his airplane collided with a helicop-
ter.I The death of Senator Heinz left a vacancy that both the Demo-
cratic and Republican Parties were eager to fill with their own respective
candidates.2 In compliance with the Pennsylvania election statute, the
leaders of each party selected a candidate to run in a special election to
fill this vacancy. 3
John S. Trinsey, Jr., a private citizen who was disgruntled by his
inability to break into the party system, challenged the validity of the
Pennsylvania statute on the ground that the statute authorized the selec-
tion of the candidate without a primary in violation of the Seventeenth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 4 In
Trinsey v. Pennsylvania,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected Trinsey's challenge and held that the Seventeenth and
Fourteenth Amendments do not require states to conduct primary elec-
tions when selecting candidates for a special election to fill a senatorial
vacancy. 6 The focus of the Third Circuit's opinion was on interpreting
the Seventeenth Amendment.7 The specific language of the Seven-
1. The airplane that was carrying Senator Heinz collided in mid-air with a
helicopter whose pilot was "inspecting the plane's landing gear after the plane
reported a problem with the nose wheel." Copter Rotor Hit Heinz's Plane, Early
Data Find, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1991, part 1, at A21.
2. For a discussion of the political parties' selection process, see infra notes
16-20 and accompanying text.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2776 (Supp. 1991). For the full text of § 2776,
see infra note 13. For a discussion of the candidates that the Democratic and
Republican Parties each chose and the selection process, see infra notes 16-29
and accompanying text.
4. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 658 (1991). Trinsey, a former Olympic rower and real estate developer, was
a Township Supervisor for Upper Merion Township, Pennsylvania at the time of
the case. Katharine Seelye, Judge: Challenge on Senate Vacancy Has Some Merit,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 30, 1991, at B5. Although Mr. Trinsey is not a lawyer, he
represented himself before the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Id. A seemingly flamboyant person, Mr. Trinsey's "court
papers are studded with unlawyerly assertions, such as: 'Jack Trinsey is an
American Freedom Fighter, the new blood that must go to Washington to cope
with the big government that is destroying not only the rights of the people of
Pennsylvania but indeed the people of this great country.' " Id.
5. 941 F.2d 224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991).
6. Id. at 236.
7. Id. at 231.
(940)
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teenth Amendment that was at issue reads: "When vacancies happen in
the representation of any State in the Senate .... the legislature of any
State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appoint-
ments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature
may direct."'8
The issue raised by Trinsey's challenge was one of first impression
before any United States court.9 Thus, in deciding to uphold the Penn-
sylvania statute, the Third Circuit established a precedent which is likely
to strongly influence future decisions on this issue.' 0
It would be reaching to apply the holding of Trinsey to issues other
than the constitutional validity of procedures surrounding senatorial va-
cancies. A narrow reading of the opinion is appropriate because the
Third Circuit based its decision specifically on its interpretation of the
Seventeenth Amendment's vacancy provision.'1 Nevertheless, one may
infer from the court's analysis that, in future cases involving other as-
pects of the Seventeenth Amendment, the Third Circuit will interpret
that amendment strictly and in relative isolation from other constitu-
tional provisions. 12
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2. For the full text of clause two of the
Seventeenth Amendment, see infra note 11.
9. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 766 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 941
F.2d 224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991).
10. Pennsylvania was the only state in the Third Circuit affected by this de-
cision. Both Delaware and New Jersey election laws already require primary
elections as part of the special election process. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 3301, 7321 (1981); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:27-6 (1989). Although the Virgin
Islands are a member of the Third Circuit, it is not represented by a United
States Senator and remains unaffected by the decision. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
11. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 231. The Seventeenth Amendment reads in perti-
nent part:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Sen-
ate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to
fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may em-
power the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the
people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2.
12. See Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 227. In Trinsey, the Third Circuit specifically
stated that the Qualifications Clause of Article I, § 2 of the United States Consti-
tution, which applied to the House of Representatives, was irrelevant to the elec-
tion of United States Senators. Id.
The Qualification Clause reads: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The Qualifications Clause is often cited as grounds for requiring
primary elections to select candidates for the general elections for the House of
Representatives. See generally Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479
U.S. 208, 227 (1986) (holding that if state required primary elections as part of
elections process, then state must protect right to vote in such primaries).
19921
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A. Factual and Procedural History
The death of Senator John Heinz left Pennsylvania without its full
representation in the United States Senate. The Pennsylvania General
Assembly had established procedures, via state statute, to fill the re-
mainder of an unexpired term should such a senatorial vacancy occur.13
The Pennsylvania statute, under section 2776 of title 25, provides
that senatorial vacancies are to be filled "for the unexpired term by the
vote of the electors of the State at a special decision" and that
"[c]andidates to fill vacancies in the office of United States Senator shall
be nominated by political parties, in accordance with party rules relating
to the filling of vacancies." 14 Neither the statute, nor the Democratic
and Republican Party rules, require that political parties hold primary
elections to select candidates for the special election to fill senatorial
vacancies. 1 5
13. The Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute outlining the procedures
for filling senatorial vacancies in 1937 under 1937 Pa. Laws 320 art. VI § 626.
The statute was amended into its current form in 1963. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 2754 (Supp. 1991). The pre-1937 statute required the state to hold primaries
to select candidates for the special election to fill the vacancy. 1913 Pa. Laws
454 § 3. This statute stated that a senatorial vacancy would be filled by a special
election "held at the time of the next general election whose antecedent primary
occurs at least sixty days after the happening of such vacancy .... Candidates
... shall be nominated at said antecedent primaries." Id.
Section 2776, which eliminated the requirement for primary elections,
reads:
Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of United States Sena-
tor, said vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term by the vote of the
electors of the State at a special election to be held at the time of the
next general or municipal election, occurring at least ninety (90) days
after the happening of such vacancy, and it shall be the duty of the
Governor to issue writs of election to the various county boards of elec-
tions and to the Secretary of the Commonwealth within ten (10) days
after the happening of said vacancy. Candidates to fill vacancies in the Office
of United States Senator shall be nominated by political parties, in accordance with
the party rules relating to the filling of vacancies.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2776 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2776. For the full text of§ 2776, see supra note
13.
15. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 225-26. Under another Pennsylvania statute, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2831 (Supp. 1991), the Democratic and Republican Parties
are named as the only political parties allowed to select their candidates in the
manner outlined in § 2776. Id. Section 2831, which was not challenged in Trin-
sey, requires that "[t]he [only] 'political parties' who are entitled to nominate
their candidates in this manner are those whose candidate for any office in the
last general election received at least two percent statewide and two percent in at
least ten counties of the largest vote cast in the state for any elected candidate."
Id.
The Supreme Court has generally held that similar statutes governing the
participation of third party candidates are constitutional. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 13-20 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe has commented
that "[a]lthough these barriers [against minority parties] to the ballot box are
[Vol. 37: p. 940942
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Until the special election could be held to fill the vacancy left by
Senator Heinz's death, 16 Governor Casey exercised his authority under
section 2776 and appointed Harris Wofford to fill the vacancy temporar-
ily. 17 That temporary appointment and the support of Governor Casey
encouraged Democratic Party leaders to select Wofford as their candi-
date for the special election to fill the unexpired term.
18
The Republican Party leaders quickly chose former Governor Rich-
ard Thornburgh as their candidate after he resigned from his position as
United States Attorney General to run in the special election. 19 Given
former Governor Thornburgh's political stature in Pennsylvania, the
Republican Party leadership did not seriously consider any other
candidates. 20
John S. Trinsey, Jr., a relative political unknown, believed that the
operation of section 2776 deprived him of the opportunity to compete
not unconstitutional per se, they become unconstitutional when too restrictive."
Id. § 13-20, at 1101. The Supreme Court has upheld a statute that "denied bal-
lot position to any political party that neither secured two percent of the vote in
the previous general election nor filed petitions signed by registered voters
numbering at least one percent of the votes cast in that prior election." Id. § 13-
20, at 1106 (citing American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974)). Tribe has
suggested that "[p]etition requirements as high as five percent are not unconsti-
tutional per se, but requirements substantially in excess of five percent probably
are." Id. § 13-20, at 1111.
16. The timing for the special election is governed by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 2776. In this case, the special election was set for and held on November 5,
1991. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 226. For the text of § 2776, see supra note 13.
17. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 226. The relevant part of § 2776 states, "Until such
time as said vacancy shall be filled by an election as herein provided, the Gover-
nor of the Commonwealth may make a temporary appointment to fill said va-
cancy." PA. STAT. ANN tit. 25, § 2776.
Harris Wofford, a long time Casey ally, was the state Secretary of Industry
and Labor prior to being appointed to the Senate. Michael deCourcy Hinds,
Race for Senate Shows Big Split on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, October 31, 1991, at B9.
Before then, Wofford last saw public service during the Kennedy administration
when he helped to establish the Peace Corps while working on the White House
Staff. Wofford, Tasting a First Victory, Is No Stranger to Public Service, BOSTON GLOBE,
November 6, 1991, at 14. After leaving the White House staff, Wofford served
as the president of the State University of New York at Old Westbury and, later,
Bryn Mawr College. Id.
18. Seelye, supra note 4, at B5. The state Democratic Committee nomi-
nated Wofford on June 1, 1991. Id.
19. Jerry Seper, Court Ruling Allows Thornburgh to Run, WASH. TIMES, August
7, 1991, at A4. The Washington Times stated:
Mr. Thornburgh ... is expected to announce his resignation shortly to
accept the GOP nomination- already assured-to seek the U.S. Senate
seat left vacant by the death of Republican Sen. John Heinz .... Chris
Bravacos, political director for the Republican State Committee in
Pennsylvania, said yesterday there was 'no question' that Mr. Thorn-
burgh was going to run.... He said the state GOP would meet some
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in the special election. 2 1 Trinsey filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that sec-
tion 2776 violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights be-
cause it allowed political party leaders to choose candidates without
holding primary elections. 22 Mr. Trinsey asked the district court to
grant two forms of relief. First, he sought to have section 2776 declared
unconstitutional and set aside. 23 Second, Mr. Trinsey sought injunctive
relief, requesting that he and others be placed on the November election
ballot, and that Harris Wofford be restrained from filling his temporary
appointment to the United States Senate. 24
After oral argument, the district court dismissed Trinsey's motions
for injunctive relief.25 The court did, however, declare that section
2776 was unconstitutional under the Seventeenth and Fourteenth
Amendments 26 because the absence of primary elections deprived Trin-
sey of the opportunity to vote for a candidate of his choice.2 7
The defendants, including among others, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the Governor,28 appealed to the Third Circuit, which
21. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 658 (1991). Section 2776 does not require the Republican and Democratic
Parties to hold any primary elections before selecting their candidates PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 2776. For the text of § 2776, see supra note 13. As a result, Trin-
sey argued that he was deprived of the opportunity to compete for the position
and that the voters were deprived of the opportunity to select a candidate. Trin-
sey, 941 F.2d at 226.
22. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 226. Trinsey's complaint alleged that § 2776 vio-
lated his Seventeenth Amendment rights. Id. Moreover, Mr. Trinsey mistakenly
alleged that § 2776 violated the Fifteenth Amendment when he actually in-
tended to refer to the Fourteenth Amendment due process right. Id. at 226 n.2.
Both the district court and the Third Circuit read the complaint as intended. Id.
23. Id. at 226.
24. Id.
25. Id. The district court concluded that Trinsey's name could not be
placed on the ballot unless he met Pennsylvania's requirements for third party
candidates. Id. at 228. For a discussion of allowable restrictions on third party
candidates, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
26. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 235. The district court determined that § 2776 vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 235. While the district court's decision did not
grant Trinsey all the relief that he desired, he stated, "It's a smashing victory for
me." Seelye, supra note 4, at B5.
28. The list of defendants was quite inclusive. Trinsey filed suit against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Department of State, the Board of Elec-
tions, the Governor and the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Trinsey, 941 F.2d
at 226. The district court allowed the Republican State Committee of Penn-
sylvania, the Pennsylvania Democratic State Committee and several party lead-
ers to intervene in the case. Id. Because Trinsey appeared pro se and was not an
attorney, the Third Circuit appointed Professor Laura E. Little of Temple Uni-
versity School of Law to argue his position. Id. at 226-27. The court wanted to
ensure that adverse interests were properly presented so that the court could
engage in "informed decisionmaking." Id.
[Vol. 37: p. 940
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reversed the district court's decision. 29 In overruling the district court
decision concerning the Seventeenth Amendment, the Third Circuit
held: (1) the Seventeenth Amendment could not be construed to re-
quire primary elections to fill senatorial vacancies, and (2) related case
law granted state legislatures wide discretion in establishing election
laws, especially when special elections were required to fill a vacancy.3 0
The Third Circuit ordered the special election to proceed according to
the Pennsylvania statute.3 '
The Third Circuit also summarily overruled the district court's
Fourteenth Amendment decision.3 2 Although its analysis was brief, the
court held that existing Supreme Court case law required it to hold that
the statute did not violate Trinsey's equal protection rights.3 3
B. District Court Analysis
The district court held that the statute violated the plaintiff's Seven-
teenth Amendment right to vote for a United States senator. 34 Because
this issue was one of first impression before any federal court, there was
no case law directly on point to guide the court.3 5 As a result, the dis-
trict court based its decision on an evaluation of the Seventeenth
Amendment's legislative history and on the reasoning of cases that the
court believed to be analogous.3 6
The district court determined that section 2776 infringed "upon the
fundamental right to vote." T3 7 The district court, therefore, applied
29. Id. at 236. Since the issues involved were questions of law, the Third
Circuit's review was plenary. Id. at 228.
30. Id. at 234.
31. Id. at 236.
32. Id. at 235-36.
33. Id. at 236 (citing Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1
(1982)).
34. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 766 F. Supp. 1338, 1347 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 941
F.2d 224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991). For the text of the Seven-
teenth Amendment, see supra note 11.
35. Trinsey, 766 F. Supp. at 1342 ("The issue before this court, whether the
right to vote must be protected at the nomination stage, has not been squarely
presented before.").
36. Id. at 1342-45. The district court relied heavily on Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986), and United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941). Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 231.
The Third Circuit stated that it read "those cases differently." Id. The
Third Circuit also distinguished these cases from the instant case on factual
grounds. Id. at 232. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of Tashjian
and Classic, see infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
37. Trinsey, 766 F. Supp. at 1347. The district court relied on two proposi-
tions in determining that a fundamental right was involved. First, the district
court stated that "[no] right is more precious in a free country than that of hav-
ing a voice in the election of those who make laws." Id. at 1342. Secondly, the
district court believed that the Supreme Court protected the right to vote in
"every stage in the selection process." Id. at 1344 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican
1992] 945
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strict scrutiny review to the Pennsylvania statute under which the statute
could be upheld only if the Commonwealth showed that the statute "ad-
vances a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."
3 8
The defendants proffered four state interests: (1) to limit the names
on the ballot; (2) to guard against "splintered parties and an unstable
political system;" (3) to prevent the "clogging of the election mecha-
nism;" and (4) to minimize the length of service of an appointed sena-
tor.39 The district court determined that these proffered interests were
not compelling and, even if the interests were compelling, the statute
was not narrowly tailored to serve those interests. 40 The district court
thus held that the statute was unconstitutional to the extent that it failed
to require primary elections in filling a senatorial vacancy. 4 1
The district court, however, upheld the operation of the statute in
two other areas, which also had been the subject of Trinsey's injunctive
relief. First, the court affirmed the constitutionality of Governor Casey's
temporary appointment of Harris Wofford to the Senate. 42 Second, the
court held that Trinsey's name would not be placed on the ballot unless
he met Pennsylvania's requirements for third party candidates. 43
Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 227 (1986)). By combining these two dis-
tinct propositions, the district court concluded that under the Seventeenth
Amendment, a general fundamental right to vote extended to the nomination
process for filling senatorial vacancies. Id. at 1347.
38. Id. at 1345. Justice William 0. Douglas appears to have originated the
term "strict scrutiny" in his opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1790 (Leonard W. Levy
et al. eds., 1986). The Court developed the test to review legislation "that dis-
criminated against the exercise of fundamental interests .... To pass the test of
strict scrutiny .... a legislat[ion] ... must be 'necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest.' " Id. (emphasis omitted).
39. Trinsey, 766 F. Supp. at 1345-46.
40. Id. The district court held that the first three state interests were not
sufficiently compelling because "Pennsylvania conducts primaries for regular
elections and has not explained why the vacancy primary presents a greater
threat to its interests than these normal primary elections." Id. at 1346. The
district court recognized that while the fourth interest had some merit, as it was
not narrowly tailored as it could have been. Id. For a list of legislative goals, see
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 226. The Third Circuit characterized the district
court's decision and reasoning as follows: "It issued a final judgment on the
merits declaring section 2776 to be unconstitutional, essentially on the ground
that the statute violates the Seventeenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XVII,
because it does not provide for a primary election before a special election to fill
a Senatorial vacancy." Id. The Third Circuit noted that the district court did
uphold certain portions of § 2776. Id. at 228. For a discussion of the portions
of § 2776 that the district court upheld, see infra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text.
42. Trinsey, 766 F. Supp. at 1347 (holding provision authorizing governor
to appoint person to temporarily fill senatorial vacancy constitutional).
43. Id. The district court stated: "The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has
no duty to include the plaintiff as an independent candidate on the November 5,
7
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C. Third Circuit Analysis
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision
and concluded that the Pennsylvania statute should be examined under
a rational relationship test, as opposed to the strict scrutiny review ap-
plied by the district court.44 Because the Commonwealth articulated
several legitimate state interests supporting the purpose of the statute,
1991 election ballot unless the plaintiff meets Pennsylvania's requirements for
third party candidates." Id. Thus, the court upheld the provision requiring a
political party to meet the state's minimum qualifications before being allowed
to place a candidate on the ballot. Id. For a discussion of the state's restrictions
on third party candidates and the Supreme Court's view on such restrictions, see
supra note 15.
44. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 234. The Third Circuit stated:
Once we conclude that the Seventeenth Amendment does not mandate
... a primary before holding a general election to fill a senatorial va-
cancy, it follows that there is no fundamental right that is infringed ....
[Therefore,] Rodriguez counsels us to apply a more deferential standard
of review over a state's choice of the manner in which to fill legislative
vacancies. [A court's focus should be] whether the "system plainly
serves [a] legitimate purpose."
Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 12 (1982)).
While the Third Circuit applied a rational relationship test, it did not ex-
pressly state which of the various rational relationship tests it was applying. The
Trinsey court appeared to apply a rational relationship test with bite. See Trinsey,
941 F.2d at 234-35; see generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (establishing relationship with bite test).
To apply its rational relationship test, the Trinsey court examined the prof-
fered legislative goals supporting § 2776 to ensure that the state's goals were
legitimate. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 234-35. Then, the court determined that § 2776
actually did further those goals which the legislature specifically proffered. Id.
For a discussion of the legislative goals, see supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
Through case law, the Supreme Court developed the rational relationship
test to evaluate certain legislative statutes. Professor Tribe stated:
The Supreme Court, from its earliest examination of socioeconomic
regulation, has considered that equal protection demands reasonable-
ness in legislative and administrative classifications .... This theory of
rationality ...between means and ends assumes that all legislation
must have a legitimate public purpose.., based on some conception of
the general good.
TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-2, at 1439-40.
Courts have applied the phrase "rational relationship test" to two different
levels of review. The lowest level of review has been described as "any conceiva-
ble basis test." McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it."); see also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 177 (1980) (applying not "patently arbitrary or irrational" test).
Under the more stringent level of review, a "classification fails unless it is
substantially related to a sufficiently important government interest." Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 440-41. In Cleburne, the Court declared a statute unconstitutional
because the proffered legislative goals were based on "irrational prejudice." Id.
at 450. Although there may have been other conceivable bases to support the
statute, the Court considered only those presented by the legislature. Id. at 447-
49.
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the Third Circuit held that the statute is constitutional under the ra-
tional relationship test.4 5
The Third Circuit found that neither the text of the Seventeenth
Amendment nor its legislative history indicate that a "state is constitu-
tionally bound to hold a primary for nominations to fill senatorial vacan-
cies." '46 Additionally, the Third Circuit noted that relevant case law4 7
suggested that the "Supreme Court views the manner in which the nom-
inees are selected to have been left to the discretion of the states."' 48
Finally, the Third Circuit dismissed Trinsey's equal protection argument
under the Fourteenth Amendment because the Pennsylvania statute
treated all voters equally. 49 As a result, the Third Circuit held that the
statute did not violate Trinsey's fundamental rights.50
1. Seventeenth Amendment Analysis
a. Legislative History of the Seventeenth Amendment
The Third Circuit first examined the Seventeenth Amendment and
its legislative history to determine whether a state must hold primaries
to select candidates for a special election to fill a senatorial vacancy. 5'
The Seventeenth Amendment is silent on the issue of primary elec-
tions.52 Therefore, if such a requirement exists, it would have to be im-
plied. The Third Circuit determined that no legislative history or other
constitutional provisions exist to support such an implication. 53
45. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 234. For a discussion of the Commonwealth goals
furthered by § 2776, see supra note *39 and accompanying text.
46. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 234.
47. The relevant case law cited by the Trinsey court includes: Rodriguez v.
Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1981) and Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F.
Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 405 (1969).
48. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 234.
49. Id. at 235-36.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 228-35. For the pertinent text of the Seventeenth Amendment,
see supra note 11.
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
53. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 230. In fact, the legislative history of the Seven-
teenth Amendment indicates that the Framers intended states to have wide dis-
cretion in establishing election procedures. The author of the Senate report on
the Seventeenth Amendment, Senator Borah, stated that "popular elections
have come peculiarly to be matters of local arrangement. The manner of hold-
ing them has become essentially local. The trend of events and the logic of
conditions have made them local." Id. (quoting 47 Cong. Rec. 1886 (1911)).
The Constitution does not specifically require, nor have the courts recog-
nized any implied requirement, that states conduct primary elections in any gen-
eral or special election. The only other constitutional provision dealing with
elections is the Qualifications Clause of Article I. For a discussion and text of
Article I, see supra note 12. Article I does not specifically require primary elec-
tions. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
The only requirement that the Supreme Court has levied on states in con-
ducting elections is that if the state chooses to utilize primary elections in the
election process, then the state must respect the constitutionally protected right
[Vol. 37: p. 940
9
Novakovic: Constitutional Law - Filling Senatorial Vacancies
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
The court noted that during the congressional debates surrounding
the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, several legislators ex-
pressed the belief that the states were moving toward a system incorpo-
rating primary elections into the selection of candidates for Senator.54
The court stated that such comments were observations on probable
trends, rather than mandates that the declarants intended to impose on
the states. 5 5
The court also examined the goals of the Seventeenth Amendment
and determined that the absence of a primary election requirement
would not frustrate any of those goals. 56 One of the goals supporting
the Seventeenth Amendment to which the Third Circuit pointed was to
lessen the influence of corrupt political bosses on senatorial elections. 5 7
As to this goal, the Third Circuit stated that there was no "firm evidence
that [the framers of the Seventeenth Amendment] believed that they
were tackling the political machines by mandating primaries as well as
direct elections of Senators."'58
to vote in such primaries. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479
U.S. 208, 227 (1986); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941) ("[Tlhis
right of participation is protected just as is the right to vote at the [primary]
election, where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election ma-
chinery ...."). For a discussion of the Tashjian opinion, see infra notes 73-76.
54. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 230. Senator McCumber stated: "Coincident, if not
preceding this change of election of United States Senators, will be nomination
of senators by popular vote. This means in most instances a double campaign,
first fought to a finish between the candidates of a particular party, and then
between the successful candidates of opposing political parties." Id. (quoting 47
CONG. REC. 1881 (1911)) (emphasis omitted). Senator McCumber seemed to
think that primaries were the trend of the future, but his statement indicates that
he did not believe that primary elections were part of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment-he specifically stated such a requirement would be "coincident" or "pre-
ceding" the passage of this particular amendment. Id. Senator Borah, author of
the Senate Report, stated that "[e]ach state has its primary elections or is com-
ing to have [them]." Id. (quoting 47 CONG. REC. 1886 (1911)).
55. Id. at 231. Representative Lenroot stated that Congress might someday
pass a law giving people "the right to nominate as well as elect." Id. (quoting 47
CONG. REC. 223 (1911)).
56. Id. at 229. The Third Circuit noted the following:
The Senators addressing the issue during the floor debates discussed
three problems [in having state legislatures select Senators]: (1) the
selection of state legislators on the basis of their ability to fill seats in
the United States Senate instead of their ability to enact state laws;
(2) the diversion of state legislatures' attention away from addressing
the problems of their states; and (3) political corruption.
Id. (citing 46 CONG. REC. 1104-05, 2256 (1911)).
57. Id. at 230. Senator Beveridge stated:
The caucus fixes who is to be nominated; conventions, run by bosses,
say who is to be nominated by both parties .... [I]f you want to en-
courage the negligence of the great privilege and duty of the voting by
the people just continue to take away from them more of their partici-
pation in government.
Id. at 230 n.7 (quoting 46 CONG. REc. 2257 (1911)).
58. Id. at 230.
1992] 949
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Finally, the court noted that even if the framers had intended to
require primary elections in general elections, such intent would not ap-
ply to special elections like the one the court now faced. 59
b. Case Law Involving the Seventeenth Amendment
Having decided that the Seventeenth Amendment and its legislative
history offered no guidance as to whether states must conduct primary
elections to select candidates for special elections to fill senatorial vacan-
cies, the Third Circuit turned to existing case law involving primary
elections .60
The Third Circuit began its analysis by distinguishing Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Connecticut6 1 and United States v. Classic,6 2 two Supreme
Court cases on which the district court relied in reaching its decision
that states are constitutionally required to conduct primary elections for
special elections. 63 Contrary to the district court, the Third Circuit in-
terpreted neither case as requiring that a state hold primary elections as
a prelude to a special election. 6 4
In Classic, the relevant issue before the Supreme Court was
"whether the right of qualified voters to vote in the Louisiana primary
and to have their ballots counted is a right secured by the Constitu-
tion."' 65 Louisiana officials were charged with altering the votes in a pri-
mary election to select a representative to Congress. 6 6 The officials
allegedly violated a federal criminal statute that made it a crime to vio-
late the constitutional rights of any United States citizen. 6 7 The defend-
ants argued that the statute did not apply because the Constitution did
not guarantee the right to vote in primary elections. 68 The Court re-
jected the defendants' argument and held that the "right of participation
is protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the primary is
by law an integral part of the election machinery."'69
59. Id. at 231 (legislative debate focused on general elections, with little
discussion of primary elections).
60. Id.
61. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
62. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
63. Tinsey, 941 F.2d at 231-33. The district court determined that the cases
supported the position that the right to nominate candidates through primary
elections should be accorded the same protection as the right to vote in a gen-
eral election. Id. The Third Circuit, however, stated that "[w]e read those cases
differently." Id. For a discussion of the district court's analysis of this right, see
supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
64. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 231-32.
65. Classic, 313 U.S. at 307.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 308.
68. Id. at 309.
69. Id. at 318 (emphasis added). Since Louisiana made the primary an inte-
gral part of the election of representatives to the House of Representatives, the
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The Third Circuit noted that the Classic court did not hold that the
Constitution requires states to conduct primary elections. 70 Instead, the
Third Circuit stated that Classic stands for the proposition that if a state
chooses to hold primary elections, then the Constitution protects the
right of qualified voters to participate. 7 1 The Third Circuit held that
because Pennsylvania did not incorporate a primary election require-
ment into the special election process, Classic did apply to the facts of
this case. 72
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in its analysis of
Tashjian. In Tashjian, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
a state could require voters in a party primary to be registered members
of that party. 73 The Connecticut legislature enacted a statute which pre-
vented any political party from allowing voters who were registered as
independents to participate in the party's primary elections.74 The Re-
publican Party challenged the law on the grounds that it violated an indi-
vidual's First Amendment right to "enter into political association with
individuals of its own choosing."' 75 The Court accepted the Republican
Party's argument and held that the Connecticut statute was unconstitu-
tional in its application. 76
Although the Tashjian decision was based on First Amendment
grounds, the Court also stated that the Seventeenth Amendment pro-
tected the right to vote in state primaries if and only if primaries were
part of the election process. 77 The Court also stated that " '[w]here the
Court held that the defendants violated the voters' right to vote under Article I,
§ 2 of the Constitution. Id.
The text of Article I, § 2 reads: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States, and the Electors in each State shall have Qualifications requisite for Elec-
tors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2.
70. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 658 (1991); see also Classic, 313 U.S. at 311. The Classic Court stated:
"[T]he states are given wide discretion in the formulation of a system for the
choice by the people of representatives in Congress. In common with many
other states Louisiana has exercised that discretion by setting up . . .primary
elections ...." Id.
71. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 231-32; see also Classic, 313 U.S. at 318.
72. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 231-32.
73. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 210-11
(1986).
74. Id. at 211-12.
75. Id. at 211. The Republican Party desired to involve independent voters
in its primary process. Id. at 212.
76. Id. at 225 (concluding that state's interests were insubstantial to justify
burdening Republican Party's First Amendment rights through enforcement of
statute).
77. Id. at 227. The district court in Trinsey relied heavily on the following
language in Tashjian to determine that primary elections must be held to select
candidates for the special election: "[T]he Seventeenth Amendment ... applies
to the entire process by which federal legislators are chosen .... The constitu-
1992]
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state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of
choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the choice ...
the Seventeenth Amendment applies to primaries as well as general
elections."178 The Third Circuit in Trinsey interpreted this language to
indicate that primary elections are not constitutionally mandated. 79
The Third Circuit further distinguished Classic and Tashjian from the
case at bar based on the nature of the elections involved. Both Classic
and Tashjian involved "regular general elections, whereas [the Penn-
sylvania statute] is concerned only with the special election of a succes-
sor to a vacancy in a Senate seat."8 0 The Third Circuit implied that even
if those cases did hold that a state must conduct primary elections in its
general elections, such a holding would not apply to special elections to
fill senatorial vacancies. 8 '
The Third Circuit then analyzed two cases that the district court did
not address: Valenti v. Rockefeller,8 2 a district court case, and Rodriguez v.
Popular Democratic Party,8 3 a Supreme Court case. Both cases strongly
indicate that state legislatures are given wide discretion in establishing
procedures to fill vacancies in elected offices. 84 The Third Circuit rea-
soned that these cases supported its position that the Pennsylvania stat-
ute should be tested under the more deferential rational relationship
test.8 5
Valenti v. Rockefeller, was decided by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York and involved a challenge to a New
York election law.8 6 The operation of the law resulted in a temporary
tional goal of assuring that the members of Congress are chosen by the people
can only be secured if that principle is applicable to every stage in the selection
process." Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 227; see Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224,
227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991). However, the district court in
Trinsey omitted relevant portions of the quote. See id.
78. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 227 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 318 (1941)).
79. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 232. The Third Circuit criticized the district court's
reliance on Tashjian because that case was "directed to the enforcement of con-
stitutional norms in primary elections provided by state law rather than to the
wholly distinct question whether the primary itself is mandated by constitutional
law." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 232-33. The Seventeenth Amendment expressly provides that the
vacancy elections will take place as the "legislature may direct." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII, § 2.
82. 292 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 405 (1969).
83. 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
84. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 234 ("The available precedent suggests that the
Supreme Court views the manner in which nominees are selected to have been
left to the discretion of the states.").
85. Id.
86. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 853; see generally N.Y. ELECTION LAw § 296 (Mc-
Kinney 1968).
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appointment to the United States Senate.8 7 The appointee held office
for 29 months before the vacancy was filled after a special election.8 8
The long appointment period was the result of the legislature's desire to
hold primary elections to select candidates for the special election.8 9
The plaintiffs in the case argued that such a long tenure by a "tempo-
rary" appointee was a violation of their Seventeenth Amendment right
to vote for a senator. 90
The Valenti court held that the statute was constitutional under the
Seventeenth Amendment because the statute represented a reasonable
exercise of the discretion that the Amendment confers upon state legis-
latures. 9 1 In support of its holding, the court stated: "[Als the Seven-
teenth Amendment has specifically given to the legislatures of the states
power to regulate vacancy elections, it is not for a federal court to substi-
tute its own judgment for that of the elected representatives of the
people."192
The Third Circuit stated that the basis for the Valenti court's deci-
sion was applicable to the case in Trinsey.93 While Valenti focused on the
length of time before the special election and Trinsey focused instead on
the non-existence of primary elections, the outcome of Valenti hinged on
the court's interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment and the dis-
cretion that the Amendment grants to state legislatures. 9 4 The Trinsey
court reasoned that the same degree of reasonable discretion should be
granted to the Pennsylvania legislature. 9 5
The Third Circuit next analyzed Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party.
87. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 853.
88. Id. at 853-55. The vacancy was created by the assassination of Robert F.
Kennedy. Id. at 853.
89. Id. at 854-55.
90. Id. at 853.
91. Id. at 866.
92. Id. at 867.
93. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 658 (1991).
94. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 855-56.
95. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 233-34. Based at least partly on Valenti, the Third
Circuit applied a rational relationship test to § 2776. Id. For a discussion of the
rational relationship test, see supra note 44.
It is unclear which test the Valenti court actually applied in its analysis of the
New York law. On the one hand, the Valenti court focused on the discretion of
the state legislature and stated that it should not substitute its own judgment for
that of the legislature. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 867. On the other hand, the court
stated that the law was constitutional because it furthered an important or sub-
stantial state interest. Id. at 866-67.
This dichotomy in the Valenti court's analysis makes it unclear whether it
applied a rational relationship or intermediate scrutiny test. The Valenti court
applied what it called "careful scrutiny." Id. at 859. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Valenti court did not find that fundamental interests were at stake: "We are
confronted with no fundamental imperfection in the functioning of democracy.
No political party or portion of the state's citizens can claim that it is perma-
nently disadvantaged .... We have, rather, only the unusual, temporary, and
19921
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In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a Puerto
Rican statute was constitutional in allowing political parties to appoint
successors to fill vacancies in the Puerto Rico legislature without holding
special elections. 9 6 While this issue did not raise any federal election
questions, the Supreme Court nevertheless analogized the claim in Rod-
riguez to the Seventeenth Amendment claim in Valenti to come to its
decision. 9 7
The Supreme Court held in Rodriguez that "[t]he methods by which
the people of Puerto Rico and their representatives have chosen to
structure the Commonwealth's electoral system are entitled to substan-
tial deference." '98 Because the statute's burden did not "fall dispropor-
tionately on any discreet group of voters," the Supreme Court held that
the law was constitutional under a rational relationship test.9 9
In Trinsey, the Third Circuit regarded Rodriguez as reflecting the
United States Supreme Court's approach to Seventeenth Amendment
issues.10 0 Based upon the Supreme Court's holding, the Third Circuit
in Trinsey held that the Pennsylvania statute at issue should receive
treatment equally deferential. 10 1
2. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis: Equal Protection Rights
In its Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis, the Third
Circuit relied exclusively on the Supreme Court's decision in Rodri-
guez. 10 2 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that the statute at issue
did not violate any of the voters' or candidates' equal protection rights
because it treated all voters and candidates equally.' 0 3 The Supreme
unfortunate combination of a tragic event and a reasonable statutory scheme."
Id. at 867. Thus, it is unlikely that the court applied a strict scrutiny test.
96. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 3 (1982). The Pu-
erto Rico Supreme Court interpreted the Puerto Rican statute to mean that the
political party to whom the predecessor belonged could appoint a single candi-
date who would be "automatically elected to fill the vacancy." Id. at 4 (citing
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 16, §§ 3206-3207 (1980)). Under the statute, if the party put
forth several candidates, then only those candidates could compete for the va-
cancy in a special primary election. Id. at 4-5.
97. Id. at 10-11. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court stated that "the fact that
the Seventeenth Amendment permits a state, if it chooses, to forgo a special
election in favor of a temporary appointment to the United States Senate sug-
gests that a state is not constitutionally prohibited from exercising similar lati-
tude with regard to vacancies in its own legislature." Id. (referring to Valenti v.
Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id. at 12. The Court stated: "[The] system plainly serves the legitimate
purpose of ensuring that vacancies are filled promptly . Id.
100. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 233.
101. Id. at 234.
102. Id. at 235-36; see Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 15. For a statement of the facts
and issue in Rodriguez, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 10. The Supreme Court noted that "[a]ll quali-
fied voters have an equal opportunity to select a district representative in the
954 [Vol. 37: p. 940
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Court stated that "[a] vacancy in the legislature is an unexpected, unpre-
dictable event, and a statute providing that all such vacancies be filled by
appointment does not have a special impact on any discreet group of
voters or candidates." 10 4
Applying the rationale in Rodriguez, the Third Circuit, held that the
challenged Pennsylvania statute, section 2776, did not operate to the
detriment of any discrete group of voters or candidates.' 0 5 The Trinsey
court stated that any senatorial vacancy is clearly unpredictable, and that
section 2776 treats all voters similarly regardless of which political
group holds power at the moment.' 0 6 As a result of the statute's equal
treatment of voters in such an unforeseeable event, the Trinsey court
held that the Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 7
III. CONCLUSION
The Trinsey case has established the precedent that a state is not
required to hold primary elections when selecting candidates for a spe-
cial election to fill a senatorial vacancy.' 0 8 The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari on the case in December of 1991,109 possibly
because the special election to fill Senator Heinz's vacancy had already
taken place in November of 1991, thus rendering the issue moot." 10
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit's reasoning would likely have with-
stood review by the United States Supreme Court for three reasons.
First, the Seventeenth Amendment specifically directs that special elec-
tions to fill senatorial vacancies are to be held as "the legislature may
direct.""' Second, the Third Circuit's opinion accurately reflects ex-
general elections; and the [statute's] interim appointment provision applies uni-
formly to all legislative vacancies whenever they arise." Id. For a discussion of
the statute in Rodriguez, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
104. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 10 n.10.
105. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 235-36.
106. Id. at 235; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2776 (Supp. 1991).
107. Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 235-36.
108. Id. at 235 (concluding that § 2776 was "a permissible exercise of [the
legislature's] discretion" (quoting Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 866
(S.D.N.Y. 1968))).
109. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991).
110. No one in Pennsylvania will again have standing to challenge § 2776
until there is another senatorial vacancy in Pennsylvania and an individual al-
leges an injury caused by the statute's operation. The United States Supreme
Court established the requirement for standing in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984). The Court stated that to establish standing, "[t]he injury alleged must
be, for example, 'distinct and palpable,' . . . not 'abstract' or 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical'." Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citations omitted). As a result of the
standing requirements articulated in Allen, a court will not entertain a challenge
to § 2776 unless a person faces imminent harm or already has been injured by
the statute.
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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isting case law on the issue. 112 The one weakness, however, in the
Third Circuit's case analysis was the manner in which it relied on Rodri-
guez to support the use of a rational relationship test to review the con-
stitutionality of the challenged Pennsylviania statute.' 13 Although its
reliance was justifiable, the Third Circuit should have laid more ground-
work to establish why the Supreme Court's analysis in Rodriguez applied
to the facts in Trinsey so that the precise rule in Trinsey could be clearly
identified for application in future costs. In spite of the factual differ-
ences between the two cases," 14 Rodriguez contained a significant amount
of language which the Third Circuit should have utilized to support its
application of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rodriguez to Trinsey. 115
Finally, the justices on the present Supreme Court tend to give state
legislatures greater deference and are less likely to imply rights not spe-
cifically granted by the Constitution." 16
In spite of Mr. Trinsey's protest, section 2776 operated smoothly to
replace the vacancy in the United States Senate created by the tragic
death of Senator John Heinz." l 7 The United States Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari was convenient not only because the issue was moot
112. For a discussion of the related case law, see supra notes 60-101 and
accompanying text.
113. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of Rodriguez, see supra
notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
114. While Rodriguez involved a vacancy in Puerto Rico's legislature, Trinsey
involved a vacancy in the United States Senate. See Rodriguez v. Popular Demo-
cratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1982); Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 225
(3d Cir.), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991).
115. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 8-9. The Supreme Court stated in Rodriguez that
"[n]o provision of the Federal Constitution expressly mandates the procedures
that a state ... must follow in filling vacancies in its own legislature." Id. at 8.
The Court supported that proposition by referring to the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 8 n.7. Such a reference clearly indicates that the Court believed that
the Seventeenth Amendment did not mandate any specific procedures that the
legislature must follow when filling senatorial vacancies.
116. BISKUPIc, THE SUPREME COURT YEARBOOK, 1989-1990, at 7-9 (1990).
Biskupic notes: "The majority's conservatism elevated the letter of the Consti-
tution and statutes. In disputes between an individual and the state, the state's
interest typically won out .... Conservatives tend to interpret the Constitution
and federal statutes narrowly ..... Id. at 7-8. Due to the recent departure of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court's conservative trend of 1991 is likely to
strengthen in 1992.
Given the Court's conservative nature, it is likely to agree with the Third
Circuit's opinion for two reasons. First, the Court would be reluctant to infer
any rights not expressly granted in the Seventeenth Amendment. Second, the
Court's tendency to defer to state legislatures would be even more pronounced
because the Seventeenth Amendment expressly grants the legislatures a degree
of discretion in filling senatorial vacancies. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
117. Harris Wofford served only six months as an appointed United States
Senator since Senator Heinz died in April and the special election was held in
November. Harris Wofford then went on to upset Governor Thornburgh in the
special election when the voters had the opportunity to select between two di-
verse candidates. Wofford, Tasting a First Victory, Is no Stranger to Public Service, supra
note 17, at 14.
17
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by the time the Court considered the case, 1 8 but also because a deci-
sion to reverse the Third Circuit might have jeopardized the election of
Senator Wofford.
Michael B. Novakovic
118. For a discussion of the timing of the special election and the Court's
consideration of the case, see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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